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Eryximachus’ Tale: The Symposium’s
Role in Plato’s Critique of Medicine
Susan B. Levin

I

Introduction

Commentators have typically dismissed Eryximachus’ speech as Plato’s
caricature of the self-important physician preceding speeches distinctly
more salient from his philosophical standpoint. This view of the logos
as unworthy of serious consideration represents a great oversimplification and undervaluing of its import. Despite Edelstein’s challenge
thereto in 1945, constructions of Eryximachus’ speech as a parody have
endured.1 In recent decades, however, a number of prominent scholars
have contested that position,2 and this shift in orientation has had a
salutary impact on explorations of his logos.
While this stance is valuable as a corrective to earlier dismissals, I
believe that it goes too far in its depictions of the merit and cogency

1

See A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff, Plato: Symposium (Indianapolis: Hackett 1989),
xvi; S. Rosen, Plato’s Symposium, 2nd edn. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
1987), 119; and K. Dover, Plato: Symposium (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1980), 105.

2

See M.L. McPherran, ‘Medicine, Magic, and Religion in Plato’s Symposium’, in J.H.
Lesher, D. Nails, and F.C.C. Sheffield, eds., Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies 2006) 71-95; R.
Hunter, Plato’s Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press 2004); C.J. Rowe,
‘The Speech of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium’, in J.J. Cleary, ed., Traditions of
Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999) 53-64; and D.
Konstan and E. Young-Bruehl, ‘Eryximachus’ Speech in the Symposium’, Apeiron 16
(1982) 40-6.
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of the doctor’s presentation. Plato’s vying with prominent opponents
— poets, sophists/rhetoricians, and doctors — for primacy on questions of human nature and thriving occupies a central place in his reflections. Plato targets the former two rivals via the technê framework
articulated in the Gorgias, under whose highly normative guidelines
they, unlike medicine, never make the grade. In this paper I argue that
the Symposium reflects a stage in Plato’s engagement with medicine that
is intermediate between the Gorgias’ overt lauding of it, contra empeiriai
like cookery, as a technê and his position in the Republic, where several
factors, including a more complex relationship between soul and body,
commit him to retract its very status as such.3 Here in the Symposium
Plato rejects medicine’s claim to be the technê par excellence — a rank
for whose undisputed allocation to philosophy he argues in the Republic4 — thus setting the stage for the latter’s withdrawal of its technê
standing tout court. Exploring the Symposium’s role in Plato’s critique of
medicine is crucial insofar as it deepens and enriches our appreciation
of the depth of his preoccupation with this central opponent.
At Gorgias 501a, Socrates had claimed that medicine looks into (1) the
nature of what it treats ( ... ) and (2) the
cause () of what it does, and can offer an account () of
each. These contentions — both foregrounded in Hippocratic treatises5
— are largely asserted and assumed to be true at this juncture, when
Plato’s rigorous conception of technê is debuted and the points of open
comparison are empeiriai, not other technai. The Symposium, I maintain,
inaugurates their critical assessment through Eryximachus’ articulation

3

In the Gorgias see 456a-c, 459a-60a, 464b-5e, and 521e-2a. For a defense of this position involving the Republic, see S.B. Levin, ‘Is Medicine a Technê? Health and
End-of-Life Care in Plato’s Republic’, in A. Chu and R. Polansky, eds., Reflections on
Bioethics and Ancient Philosophy (Philosophical Inquiry suppl.; Athens 2007) 125-53.

4

See S.B. Levin, The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry Revisited: Plato
and the Greek Literary Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press 2001), Chap.
5. I concentrate here exclusively on the sequence Gorgias-Symposium-Republic. For
discussion of Plato’s subsequent reappraisal of medicine, see S.B. Levin, ‘A Rivalry
Dissolved: The Restoration of Medicine’s Technê Status in the Laws’, forthcoming
in Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought.

5

Concerning physis see, e.g., De vetere medicina 3.29, 7.9, 14.18, 24, 20.11; De victu I,
2.3, 6.9, 11.3, 12.16, 16.4, 24.20, 32.77, and 35.91. For remarks featuring aitia/aition,
one may consult, e.g., De vetere medicina 1.5, 6.15, 11.1, 16.3, 20.16, 21.10 (which distinguishes the falsely-dubbed explanatory factor from a genuine ), 23.8;
De victu I, 36.2, 9, and 12.
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of what he, qua medical professional, views as the governing nature
of all. This account indicates what are from Plato’s standpoint grave
shortcomings in physicians’ orientation toward nature and flourishing:
Eryximachus, standing in here for physicians as a class, has not — and
cannot, given his fundamental orientation qua medical practitioner
— explored what they genuinely comprise. The Symposium does not
dispute the technê status of true medical expertise if its applications are
kept within proper bounds (as when Eryximachus cures the hiccups
of Aristophanes, 185d-e with 189a). The physician’s logos, however, far
from centering on such matters, purports to offer a comprehensive account of physis and eudaimonia. It is medicine’s capacity to speak meaningfully here that Plato is compelled to challenge as he seeks to fortify
philosophy’s preeminence in this all-important domain.

II

Medicine as the Technê Par Excellence

According to Edelstein, Eryximachus’ speech ‘is not a caricature but
rather an historically correct picture of a medical man of that time. It
cannot have been Plato’s intention to deride Eryximachus as a pedant,
a system-monger, unduly fond of medicine.’6 While Edelstein rightly
declines to endorse the received position centering on parody, his claim
that Eryximachus is not irrationally attached to (i.e., ‘unduly fond’ of)
his art is, I believe, untenable. Having argued for the ancient pedigree of
medicine qua dietetics (Chaps. 3-5), in Chapter 20 of De vetere medicina
— which vigorously targets the foundational role that philosophy had
thus far played in grounding medical theorizing7 — the Hippocratic
author observes that
certain physicians and philosophers assert that no one can know
medicine who lacks understanding of what man is ... But the question
they raise is one for philosophy ... My view is that ... clear knowledge

6

L. Edelstein, ‘The Rôle of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium’, in O. and C.L. Temkin, eds., Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press 1987) 153-71, at 159.

7

On this function see J. Longrigg, Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine
from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians (London: Routledge 1993); and J. Jouanna, ‘The
Birth of Western Medical Art’, in M.D. Grmek, ed., Western Medical Thought from
Antiquity to the Middle Ages (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998) 2271.
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about nature can be acquired from medicine and from no other source
(     ), and that one can attain this
knowledge when medicine itself has been properly comprehended,
but until then it is quite impossible — I mean to possess this information, what man is, by what causes he is made, and similar points
accurately.8

The work of philosophers like Empedocles (polemically engaged by
the author at 20.5-6) offers accounts peri phuseôs including man, whose
broad sweep encompasses all based on the same archai. The Hippocratic author’s perspective grounded in medicine leads him to claim,
against philosophy, that, for instance, there is no single human nature
but rather varying constitutions ( , 20.41; cf. 12.1); moreover,
the salience of hot and cold — which figure heavily as opposites in
philosophic logoi — is deemphasized at length in accounting for health
and disease (Chaps. 15-19). Having inverted the direction of inquiry
involving nature — with medicine quite pointedly taking precedence
over philosophical investigation peri phuseôs — the author makes no
attempt to offer the equally comprehensive account that a full reversal
of authority requires. The more modest scope of De vetere medicina 20 is
suggested by the author’s contenting himself with stating that the physician must, at any rate (), know ‘regarding nature’ (
) ‘what man is in relation to foods and drinks’ — differential
reactions across constitutions involving cheese serves for purposes of
illustration — and to his lifestyle more generally.
What the Hippocratic author provides here, and in the treatise as
a whole, is starkly inadequate as a logos grounding the all-embracing epistemological priority of medicine. Even if one concurs with
Longrigg that this work construes physis narrowly, Hippocratic medicine relied on the placement of man in the broader setting of his
environment — a view itself inherited from philosophy, as Longrigg

8

Renderings of Hippocratic treatises are from Hippocrates, W.H.S. Jones, tr., Vols. 1
and 4, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1923 and
1931, respectively), at times with modifications. That the author views philosophical theorizing as well nigh useless to the inquiry in question is strongly suggested
by his comment that ‘all that philosophers or physicians have said or written on
nature no more pertains to medicine than to painting (   
)’ (20.9-11).
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observes.9 Notably, De aere, aquis, locis foregrounds an essential dependency of ‘the greatest triumphs in the practice of his art’ (2.20-1,
cf. Chap. 1) on the physician’s apprehension of wider phenomena
falling in the domain of astronomy. Bringing medical expertise to
bear in particular geographical settings necessitates his ‘knowing the
changes of the seasons, and the risings and settings of the stars, with
10
the circumstances of each of these phenomena’ (2.14-16).
Like the author of De vetere medicina, Eryximachus begins by stressing that his knowledge entire was gained through medicine ( 
, 186a7).11 McPherran draws on De vetere medicina 20 to support
the contention that ‘given his grand theorizing and his citation of Heraclitus, Eryximachus seems very much the kind of physician targeted
by this Hippocratic author.’12 I maintain, in contrast, that the general
stance taken is that of De vetere medicina but that here, with Eryximachus, we actually have in concentrated form an attempt of the broad
sort ultimately required to support the Hippocratic author’s claim for
the epistemological preeminence of medicine. Though it reflects this
general approach, Eryximachus’ vision is more ambitious still since his
cognitive authority allegedly encompasses not only the human and cosmological domains but also hoi theoi. While the theoretical orientation
is that of De vetere medicina, Eryximachus’ methodology parallels, and

9

On these points see Longrigg, Rational Medicine, 84 with 239n2, and 99, respectively.

10

On astronomia for the Greeks as including meteorology, see Dover, Symposium,
110.

11

Citations of Plato are from the OCT editions. Those of Vol. 1 are from the edition
of E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, and J.C.G. Strachan (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), and the edition of S.R. Slings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2003) has been used for the Republic. Remaining references are to
the edition of J. Burnet, 5 Vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1900-7). Translations of the Symposium are either drawn from Nehamas and Woodruff, with certain adjustments, or my own. Renderings of other dialogues are from J.M. Cooper,
ed., Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett 1997), with some alterations.

12

‘Medicine’, 79. Cf. his assertion that Eryximachus is ‘Plato’s response to all other
physicians who would rank the craft of medicine as superior to, rather than subordinate to, the new craft of philosophy’ (87, emphasis added). While McPherran
notes that ‘Plato has no patience with medicine’s overblown claims’ (77n16), the
aforementioned remark, combined with his assertion that Eryximachus ‘serves as
Plato’s model of a properly philosophically-oriented physician’ (94n52), commits
him to the view that Eryximachus does not represent the targeted group.
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is in fact a version of, De victu I’s voluminous citing of technai (Chaps.
12-24) to support its case for the single governing nature of all.13
In Symposium 186a3-b2 the physician offers a general statement of
his thesis (cf. its reiteration at 187e6-8a1), according to which medicine
has taught him (
) that
Love does not occur only in the human soul; it is not simply the attraction we feel toward human beauty: it is a significantly broader phenomenon. It certainly occurs within the animal kingdom, and even
in the world of plants. In fact, it occurs everywhere in the universe
(). Love is a deity of the greatest
importance: he permeates everything (    
), not only in the human domain, but also in that
of the gods.

This opening grounds the claim that Eryximachus, like the author of De
vetere medicina, considers iatrikê to be the preeminent technê:14 it functions here as the source of his overarching vision, of which immediate appeal to the particulars of his own specialty (
      , b2-3) — followed
by theoretical treatment of other praxeis whose technê status the physician assumes — offers confirmation. In principle one might claim that
groups of experts may access ultimate truths from, or through, different
initial vantage points, with its being shown here how one might do so
via medicine. Eryximachus’ actual position, however, is that medicine’s
vantage point is unique by comparison with the other so-called technai
discussed — thus paralleling methodologically Chapter 12 of De victu
— and, most importantly, with philosophy. As we will see in Section
IV, that for Eryximachus qua physician philosophy is the key rival for
authority involving physis and eudaimonia is foregrounded significantly

13

As all references to De victu in the paper are to Book I of that treatise, hereafter I
cite it simply as ‘De victu’.

14

While I concur with the stress of L. Robin, Platon: Œuvres complètes, Vol. 4, pt. 2:
Symposium (Paris: Société d’Édition ‘Les Belles Lettres’ 1929), lii and 24n2, on medicine à la Eryximachus as the technê par excellence, we underscore different ties
to the Hippocratic corpus. On medicine as the ‘primary’ technê for Eryximachus,
see Rosen, Symposium, 105. Cf. E. Hoffmann, Über Platons Symposion (Heidelberg:
Kerle 1947), 11, who imbeds the point in a quite different interpretive structure.
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in the longest segment of his speech, that concerning mousikê, by his
semi-polemical naming of Heraclitus and stressing of the philosopher’s
wholesale dependence on him for appropriation in a manner that is
clear and proper.
Reinforcing the substance of these framing remarks, Eryximachus
avails himself of every conceivable opportunity to underscore (1) the
technê status of his own pursuit and (2) the fact that its practitioners operate with knowledge — this abundance of mentions contrasting sharply with the case of other technai, including mousikê though discussion of
it surpasses even that of medicine in length. Early on there are ten pertinent occurrences of the former variety involving medicine. We find
 or a cognate on four occasions:    (186a7-b1),
 (b3),  (c5),  (e3); and or
a cognate on six:  (a7),  (b3), 
(c3),  (c5),   (d1),   (e4). The physician’s
superlative cognitive state is also foregrounded from the start: 
(186c6),  (c7),  (d4), and  (e1, in a
reference to Asclepius). This emphasis continues as the speech unfolds:
for pertinent remarks see 187a2 (,
doubtless meant in a self-congratulatory fashion); 187c2-3 (
 ); c6-7 (    ); e4 ( 
); and e6 ().
A supposed presiding role granted to Eryximachus in the proceedings has been cited as clear evidence of his distinctive import. According to Edelstein, Eryximachus is the ‘peer [of his fellow symposiasts],
nay, in some respects, their superior. For he exercises a certain authority
over them. Within the framework of the dialogue, he is indeed more
important than anybody else.’15 While Edelstein’s discussion rightly
notes that the physician is an evident player on what I call the ‘metalevel’, this characterization of his import is too strong; moreover, it goes
awry in maintaining that the role he possesses is unequivocally a point
in Eryximachus’ favor by helping to establish his positive weight as a
presence on the occasion. Eryximachus assumes that, qua practitioner
of iatrikê, he is the one most properly equipped to oversee a gathering
that encompasses prominent poets and a highly esteemed philosopher
— and to do so, moreover, in connection with a topic, namely, erôs, that

15

‘Rôle’, 164. Cf. his reference to ‘the [physician’s] exceptional rôle’ (164) and to the
‘introductory scene ... [as] dominated by Eryximachus,’ whose ‘outstanding part’
continues (163).
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ostensibly has far more directly to do with these other domains. If Eryximachus’ framing role were clearly overarching, this would arguably
buttress the claim of his subsequent encomium that iatrikê is preeminent. Here, however, as in the content of his own logos, the physician’s
pretensions exceed his actual authority: in point of fact, Eryximachus’
efforts on the meta-level do not patently stand above all others in import; in addition, they are far from rigorous and uncompromising regarding virtue qua sôphrosunê — this latter fact being suggestive for the
light it casts on the construction of that aretê in his own contribution to
the proceedings (regarding which see Section III below).
On the matter of drinking as discussed at the outset, Eryximachus
actually takes his cue from others: It is Pausanias, supported by Aristophanes, who proposes a significant reduction in the accustomed level
of drinking (176a-b); Eryximachus then consults Agathon’s wishes —
which happen to coincide with those of his fellow symposiasts — before
identifying this expressed preference as a  (c1).16 Furthermore, it
is Phaedrus’ putting his seal of approval (d5-7) on Eryximachus’ urging
against heavy drinking, particularly among those ‘suffering the effects
of a previous night’s excesses’ (d4), that clinches the company’s decision to eschew de facto mandatory drunkenness, allowing each person,
on Eryximachus’ formulation — which echoes   
 (e2-3), as resolved by the group — to drink as much as he likes
(, e5). In the view of Rowe, Eryximachus’ claim about heavy drinking as the fruit of insight gained from
medicine (d1-3) is something that ‘everyone ... knows perfectly well’;17
this suggestion finds support in the fact that the idea is generated and
affirmed by non-specialists before Eryximachus himself weighs in. Given this broader context, I find the contention of Edelstein that the physician is ‘responsible for the decision that the symposium be not devoted to
excessive drinking’ (emphasis added) to be too strong.18
Following dismissal of the flute-girl at his suggestion, Eryximachus,
who has just received support from Phaedrus, his paramour, returns

16

Deferential appeal to Agathon qua victor and host might well be expected, but
this takes nothing away from the fact that Eryximachus’ ‘scientific’ formulation is
heavily nested in remarks by all of the original symposiasts besides Socrates.

17

C.J. Rowe, Plato: Symposium (Warminster: Aris and Phillips 1998), ad loc. Hence,
‘Phaedrus’ reply ... and everyone else’s ready agreement that they should listen to
the expert (e1-3) ... are then easily taken as mock-serious.’

18

‘Rôle’, 162
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the favor, drawing Phaedrus into the spotlight by proposing a topic
that originates with him (177a) — and whose own encomium, offered
first, will be largely an apologia for the existing type of bond between
erastês and erômenos. Socrates, like Phaedrus in what precedes — but
clearly the attendee with the greatest cachet, as evidenced from the
start by the latitude he receives for what would otherwise be viewed as
merely an ill-timed arrival stemming from rudeness (175c-d) — throws
his weight strongly behind the proposal, sealing thereby the company’s
approval of it (177e7-8a1).19 Placed in its broader context, Eryximachus’
presence at this juncture is less dominant than it might appear when
isolated therefrom.
Phaedrus and Eryximachus’ having been linked together at the outset through their reciprocal support, in what follows the role of authority is well-nigh evenly divided between the two: while Aristophanes’
hiccups are addressed by Eryximachus (185d-e), Phaedrus is front and
center when ensuring that the company stays on track prior to Agathon’s speech (194d-e). Moreover, Socrates turns to Phaedrus thereafter for permission both to depart in his own logos from the traditional
form of encomia and to question Agathon before so doing (199b-c);
coming full circle, Socrates addresses Phaedrus twice more qua overseer at its close (212b-c). Eryximachus’ final appearance, like that at the
start, shows him once more prepared to defer to others where conduct
bearing on sôphrosunê is involved: the physician is willing to tolerate
the heavy drinking that Alcibiades had initiated upon his arrival (214a)
if it is accompanied by either talk or song; given this fact, Alcibiades’
pointed lauding of Eryximachus’ father, but not the son, as ‘most selfcontrolled’ (b4) is arguably ironic.20 Having acceded to Alcibiades on
this crucial point of procedure — a marked departure from the less immoderate course that he had supported early on — Eryximachus urges
him to praise Socrates (214d) in what the physician cannot know at
that moment will be a logos that actually fits well with what precedes.
As he was pivotal at the outset when the choice of erôs as topic was
confirmed, Socrates now grants his acceptance to the course in ques-

19

Socrates’ distinctive status as someone for whom such conduct is habitual and
accepted is reprised at 220c; cf. R.G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Heffer 1932), xix.

20

Eryximachus had been identified at the outset as the ‘son of Acumenus’ (176b5).
For a different interpretation of this reference to Eryximachus’ father, see both
Rowe, Symposium, and Bury, Symposium, ad loc.
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tion (214e).21 That the lovers’ departure, too, is joint (223b), as befits the
nature of their tie, reinforces the collaborative nature of their earlier
role.22 Having underscored the limits of Eryximachus’ role on the metalevel even as the physician views it as dominant — which discrepancy
reinforces Plato’s stress on the unbridled extravagance of the doctor’s
claim to cognitive authority in his own encomium of Erôs — let us now
turn to that logos itself, which will be our focus in the remainder of the
paper.

III

Desire, Self-indulgence, and Self-control

Central to judging the caliber of Eryximachus’ logos is his remarks involving akolasia in 186b-c and 187d-e. The Republic’s handling of the
soul-body relationship devotes special concern to a tie in the case of
23
appetite and self-control. In fact, the Gorgias’ account of well-being
had already given particular weight to epithumiai, akolasia, and sôphrosunê. In both cases — as well as in the Symposium through Socrates’
speech — Plato squarely opposes latitude for the indulging of desire,
promulgated in Eryximachus’ speech by the physician’s retention of
the self-serving dimension of his predecessors’ logoi that sought to justify yielding, under ‘proper’ circumstances, to the sexual overtures of
the erastês.
In 186b8-c1, Eryximachus offers an analogy involving body and soul
— one simply assuming Pausanias’ infrastructure regarding appropriate submission to its physical expression: ‘Just as, following Pausanias,
it’s admirable to submit to good men but shameful to gratify those who

21

As to why Socrates assents to this seeming departure, might we have reason
to think that, based on his knowledge of what has — and has not — transpired
between himself and Alcibiades, for him less of a shift than met the eye would
be taking place? On the account of W.J. Prior, ‘The Portrait of Socrates in Plato’s
Symposium’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31 (2006) 137-66, which provides
such a justification, Alcibiades, having glimpsed the ‘private face’ of Socrates (1601), sees that his evincing of ‘erotic attachment to youths’ qua sexual yearning is
ironic (158), and Alcibiades’ encomium ‘affirms’ Socrates’ completion of the ascent
(164).

22

Cf. Edelstein, ‘Rôle’, 164n38, though, as what follows will make clear, I diverge
from his further claim that their being the sole individuals mentioned by name
here is ‘a feature that stresses their moderation.’

23

For supporting evidence see Levin, ‘Technê’, 128-30.
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are self-indulgent, so too with the body’ (

).24 While the issue concerning the vice of akolasia is formulated here to preclude one’s submitting
to those who are akolastoi — with the implication that refraining is integral to one’s own prospects for not becoming such oneself — the point
is subsequently framed in terms of the agent’s avoiding the formation
of the negative character trait of akolasia. Hence the physician asserts
(187d4-e6) that
the same account applies once again (),
namely, that the love felt by good people — and by those who though not
yet good might become such — must be gratified and protected. And this
is the admirable, heavenly Erôs, the Erôs of the Ouranian Muse. The
other, that of Polyhymnia, is boorish (), and must be applied
cautiously to those to whom it applies, in order that one enjoy the pleasure of
it but instill no self-indulgence (), just as () in our technê
great effort is expended to use well the desires associated with the art
of cookery in order that people take pleasure without illness (

).

On the account of Rowe, 187d4-7 introduces ‘the possibility of finding
artfulness and wit in Eryximachus (things said with a nudge and a
wink),’ thereby offering a partial ‘antidote to the attribution to him of

24

Reinforcing the bond between the two logoi retrospectively is Aristophanes’ use
of a dual form (, 189c3) to express his view that Eryximachus and Pausanias had adopted the same approach; cf. Rosen, Symposium, 92n8. The poet’s later
stress on the optimal interpersonal tie’s not being grounded in sexual relations
(192c-d) offers a pointed correction of the stance that he had opposed in 189c. As
K. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989),
observes, the verb  referred specifically to sexual activity (see 44, 834, and 157). It appears on numerous occasions in Pausanias’ speech (182a2, b3,
d1, 183d7, 184a2, b6, d2, e4, 185a1, 6, b5). The verb also occurs several times in
Eryximachus’ remarks (186b9, c3, 187d6, and 188c4); the first instance, as we saw,
grounds an approving reference to Pausanias’ account of the circumstances under
which submission to an erastês is justified. In the view of G.F. Rettig, Platons Symposion (Halle: Waisenhaus 1876), Eryximachus — whose speech is tied so closely
to Pausanias’ that the two ‘gewisser Massen ein Ganzes bilden’ (13) — ‘die Lust als
höchstes Ziel anerkennt und zu seiner Hauptaufgabe macht’ (19).
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mere pedantry.’25 I diverge from Rowe on this point, believing instead
that Plato is dead serious here in attributing precisely the views he does
to the physician. While at first blush this formulation may appear to
concede more than its predecessor, I suggest that Plato simply spells
out what the earlier, compact version amounts or commits one to, given
human fallibility in assessments of character (acknowledged by Pausanias at 185a-b) issuing in conclusions about those with whom to engage
and, most fundamentally, the fact that once such a desire is indulged,
it is all but impossible for one to set limits to it. Indicating more overtly
where the danger lies in practice brings to the fore what for Plato is so
deeply problematic about the position.
According to Plato, sôphrosunê, integral to thriving, entails strict
appropriateness in kinds and objects of desire, with that of a sexual
nature centrally excluded as impermissible. Wardy refers aptly here
26
to Diotima’s ‘systematic devaluation of the flesh.’ That the view expressed by Eryximachus is antithetical to Plato’s own is manifest, for
instance, in the dialogue’s placement of the sexual expression of erôs on
the lowest tier of pre-ascent forms thereof (207d) — which focus is contrasted with pursuing erôs correctly (, 210a6 and 211b5) where
interpersonal ties are involved. It is also strongly evinced by Diotima’s
pointed juxtaposition of two incompatible lives (211d-12a) directly
following her articulation of the ascent. In addition, Socrates’ remarkable, unflinching resolve in the face of Alcibiades’ persistent advances
(a precise reflection of the stance expressed in 211d-12a) fundamentally juxtaposes two antithetical lives in a manner loosely analogous
to the Gorgias’ foundational clash between rhetoric and philosophy as
grounding modes of existence — the former, qua empeiria, built around
pleasure and flattery — with Socrates’ conduct reflecting his embodiment of true sôphrosunê (217a-19d; Alcibiades’ grudging respect for this
aretê is expressed at 219d3-5).27 Reinforcing the point, moreover, Plato’s
critical treatment of mousikê in Republic II-III culminates in a strong,
express prohibition against ‘excessive pleasure’ (,
402e3), with a special focus on sexual activity, as proper attraction to

25

‘Speech’, 62

26

‘The Unity of Opposites in Plato’s Symposium’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
23 (2002) 1-61, at 29

27

Cf. the reference of Bury, Symposium, 148, to ‘the inner ’ of Socrates.
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the fine and orderly, forged through mousikê, is a sine qua non of flourishing (402e-3c).28
A harbinger of Plato’s stance regarding desire and self-control is evident in the Gorgias, where he foregrounds the nature of epithumiai and
their relation to akolasia. Like Eryximachus, who singles out, in closing,
sôphrosunê and dikaiosunê, the Gorgias puts special weight on these two
aretai (478d, 493d, 504d-e, 507d-8a, and 519a). In this dialogue we find
that one wishing to flourish must foster sôphrosunê, whose cultivation
requires his ‘flee[ing] away from lack of discipline () as fast
as his feet will carry him’ (507d2). The Gorgias’ message, contra that of
Eryximachus — who himself echoes Phaedrus and Pausanias — is that
one cannot indulge inappropriate desires at all without capitulating to
badness within. At 507e1-8a4 we find that one seeking to be good
should not allow his appetites to be undisciplined or undertake
to fill them up (      
 ) — a never-ending evil — and live the life of
a marauder. Such a man could not be dear to another man or to a
god ... Wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness,
self-control, and justice (
) hold together heaven and earth, and
gods and men, and that is why they call this universe a world order
(), my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder (
).

This passage is intriguingly juxtaposed against Eryximachus’ culminating observations involving virtue and flourishing from a divergent
ontological and epistemological standpoint:
Such is the power () of Love — so varied and great that in all
cases it might be called absolute. Yet its power () is greatest
when Love is directed, in self-control and justice, toward good things
(),
whether in heaven or on earth: happiness, the bonds of human society,
concord with the gods above — all these are among his gifts (

28

Plato’s exclusion of sexual activity from the highest expression of erôs is, moreover, central to the Phaedrus’ account (see 250e, 253d-4e, and 256a-b). On Plato and
sexual activity, cf. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 163-4 and 167-8.
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). (188d4-9)

While Eryximachus’ quest to showcase the all-encompassing cognitive
reach of his technê is strikingly evident once again in these closing remarks, their glancing, ad hoc reference to virtue and thriving indicates
a failure to treat them as properly integral, let alone reflect on what they
actually entail. Though parallels between the two dialogues’ comments
may strike one at first blush, on closer inspection telling differences
emerge: Eryximachus is at pains to stress that the power () to
ensure virtue and flourishing stems from Erôs alone — the term ap29
pears twice in these lines (d4 and 7), and the participle at d8 — instead
of, like Diotima, identifying the good as the arbiter of its proper role.
In fact, the physician speaks of goods () instead of the good (d5)
though the Gorgias had been at pains to keep externals (introduced at
451d-2d) sharply distinct from the good of the virtuous life (see 4778, including          at
478d7-8). In addition, Gorgias 507e-8a ties excellence and well-being to
order, prefacing its observations on aretê with a reminder that self-control and justice are accessible only to those whose epithumiai are rightly
controlled (507d6-e3) — a tie that, as we have seen, Eryximachus had
obtrusively declined to forge in what precedes.
Salient on the topic of desire and technê is, moreover, Plato’s contention at Gorgias 503c7-d2 that ‘a man should satisfy those of his appetites
that ... make him better (
), and not those that make him worse,
and ... this is a matter of craft (    ).’ Recurring to
the point shortly thereafter, but here formulating it in terms of justice,
Plato maintains that a technê is required to keep one from its opposite
(509d-10a).30

29

Dunamis is a quite salient term in the Hippocratic Corpus: see, e.g., De vetere medicina 3.24, 44, 13.33, 14.7, 15.17, 26, 16.2, 17.11, 15, 19.23, 27, 55, 22.2, 24.1; De victu
2.12, 15, 26, 3.3, 7, 4.10, 10.18, 20, 35.53, 87, and 102.

30

Socrates’ status as a philosopher is stressed at 481d3-4 (cf. 482a2-b1, 484c5-6d1),
and the philosopher’s excellent soul is said to fare well in the afterlife (526c). 527d
indicates that a turn to politics is appropriate only after one is secure in the practice
of aretê, and at 521d7 mention is made of ‘the true political technê.’ Such passages,
taken together, support the view that Plato envisions here a single technê, between
the aspects of practitioners’ role he has not yet clearly distinguished.
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The Gorgias itself suggests that this technê cannot be medicine. As
emphasized in the Republic (406c-e), a human existence is not worth
preserving at all costs; in fact, so doing can undermine justice. Life with
a ruined body should not continue (Grg 505a). Plato’s elaboration of the
claim in 511b-12e notes crucially that
if a man afflicted with serious incurable physical ailments did not
drown [while with the helmsman], this man is miserable for not dying
and has received no benefit from him. But if a man has many incurable
diseases in what is more valuable than his body, his soul, life for that
man is not worth living, and he won’t do him any favor if he rescues
him from the sea or from prison or from anywhere else. (512a2-b1)

Philosophically, the way was paved in part for this conclusion by
Socrates’ argument that ‘injustice ... and lack of discipline (  ...
) and all other forms of corruption of soul are the greatest evil there is (   )’ (477e4-6) — far greater
than any misfortune and misery tied to disease (477e-80d). Since medicine is not the technê whose subject matter is justice, and ensuring its
implementation lies at the core of flourishing, medicine cannot occupy
the pinnacle of technai. Indeed, restoring an individual to health can be
at odds with the promotion of justice, as when the soul in question is
incurable (477e-8d with 512a2-b1; cf. the closing myth at 525b-e). If this
is so, it should turn out not only that medicine qua technê is not preeminent but also that, in certain types of situation, its operations will
require supervision by the practitioner of the technê that presides over
justice. This latter point is not showcased till the Republic, where it will
be crucial to the further shift in Plato’s stance toward medicine there.
At the close of the Gorgias (527e), Plato exhorts us to take the logos
that he has provided as our guide to what flourishing consists in and
the path toward its cultivation. Among the responsibilities of the technê
referred to at 503c7-d2 would be an articulation of the nature of desire,
including the allocation to classes of its types and their impact on the
soul. Such an account, we are to learn, medicine cannot provide: if we
follow Plato’s own logos — as presented in the Gorgias, and expanded
in the Symposium and Republic — the competing logos of Eryximachus is
necessarily disqualified thereby as sure to lead us astray.
Finally, Eryximachus’ close linkage of medicine with cookery reinforces the account provided above. He states: ‘We must be careful to enjoy [the pleasure of Polyhymnia] without slipping into debauchery. This
case, I might add, is strictly parallel to a serious issue in my own field,
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namely, the problem of regulating the appetite so as to be able to enjoy a
fine meal without unhealthy aftereffects’ (187e1-6). As Rowe observes,
Eryximachus’ remark involving cookery ‘hint[s] that medicine has a
role to play in preventing “immorality.” ’31 Notably, the doctor’s provision of this function for cookery runs in tandem with his assumption of
latitude for the indulgence of sexual desire. In the Hippocratic Corpus,
cookery is deemed a technê whose proper aim includes the fostering of
pleasure (; De victu 18). Yet in the Gorgias cookery, whose technê status Eryximachus clearly takes for granted (  
, 187e4-5), is repeatedly and pointedly relegated, with rhetoric,
to the lowly sphere of empeiriai. There we find, for instance, that kolakeia
— an umbrella term for the modus operandi of empeiriai — ‘considers
not at all whatever is best; with the lure of what’s most pleasant at the
moment, it sniffs out folly and hoodwinks it, so that it gives the impression of being most deserving’ (464d1-3, and 464b-6a more generally). In
one of many disparaging remarks about cookery, specifically, Plato announces disdainfully that those adept at it are mere ‘servants, satisfiers
32
of appetites’ ( ... , 518c3-4). As
Rettig rightly maintains, given this backdrop, Eryximachus’ recourse to
cookery cannot but lower medicine’s standing in Plato’s eyes.33

IV

Heraclitus

Also key to the delineation of Plato’s stance toward medicine in the
Symposium is the physician’s handling of mousikê, which follows that
of medicine — exceeding it in length and featuring a pointed, subordinating invocation of an eminent Presocratic philosopher. Eryximachus shifts to his treatment thereof by stating that ‘the entire technê of
medicine is guided by Erôs, just as is the case with (  )
gymnastics and farming; and it is clear to anyone who gives it a moment’s thought (
) that the same is true also in the case of mousikê’ (186e4-7a3, cf.
187c4-7). McPherran notes that ‘Hippocratic physicians at the time did

31

Symposium, 150

32

See also 462d-e, 463b, 500b, 500e-1a, 517d-18d, and 521e-2a.

33

Symposium, 165 and 172-3
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take a self-conscious interest in such things as music.’34 In keeping with
this inclination, Eryximachus takes it as natural that he is qualified to
pronounce on this topic. His formulation here (  
     , 187a2; cf.  , c6)
is ironic insofar as, it turns out, the esteemed philosopher Heraclitus
— himself influential in certain Hippocratic treatises, particularly De
alimento and De victu — does not succeed in expressing this basic cosmic truth and hence depends on the aid of Eryximachus qua physician
for the chance to be viewed as proferring an insight as opposed to an
absurdity. Indeed, the Hippocratic distinction between experts and laypeople — and between better and worse physicians — would lose its
force if such an insight were not in fact a challenge to achieve. Crucial to
appreciating the full impact of Heraclitus’ inclusion here is, first of all,
the very mention of his name insofar as ‘the use of proper names in a
35
polemical context was not a custom typical of the fifth century.’ In fact,
the use of adversaries’ appellations by Hippocratic authors was so rare
that there are just three such references across the entire corpus.36 Let us
now turn to the manner of Eryximachus’ engagement with Heraclitus.
As Nehamas and Woodruff observe,37 Eryximachus gets Heraclitus
completely wrong in the exegesis that he proffers in 187a-c. Rowe diverges from this stance, interpreting the discussion as a ‘transparent’ instance (emphasis added) of ‘artfulness and wit in Eryximachus (things
said with a nudge and a wink).’38 The physician is here ‘pretending to
put Heraclitus right, in a show of “learning”’ (italics in original). Rowe
elaborates:
[I]f Plato knows what Heraclitus actually meant, as he presumably
did, there is no reason to suppose that Eryximachus is not supposed
to know it — unless we have other grounds for thinking him (meant
to be) ignorant of the field, including cosmology, in which he is operat-

34

‘Medicine’, 77

35

Jouanna, ‘Birth’, 53

36

See J. Jouanna, ‘Présence d’Empédocle dans la Collection Hippocratique’, Bulletin
de l’Association Guillaume Budé, ser. 4 (1961) 452-463, at 461n68: as noted by Jouanna, these are to Empedocles (mentioned above) in De vetere medicina 20; Melissus
in De natura hominis 1.34; and the physician Herodicus in Epidemiarum 6.3.18.

37

Symposium, ad loc

38

‘Speech’, 62. Cf. Hunter, Symposium, 55.
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ing. But there are no such grounds (as everyone notices, he seems to
know something about Empedocles).

As I argue in what follows, we have very good reason, indeed, for believing that Plato wishes to reveal the physician as ignorant here. In
addition, the comparison to Empedocles is inapposite, as key notions of
the Pluralist, himself impacted by Alcmaeon, are far more routine and
pervasive as a backdrop for medical theorizing in the fifth century.39
While De alimento and De victu simply incorporate without comment
versions of Heraclitean ideas, Eryximachus treats the philosopher in a
semi-polemical fashion, as evidenced by the manner of his introduction of Heraclitus to ground his lengthy treatment of mousikê as, like
medicine, ‘everywhere guided by Love’ (186e4-7a1): ‘This is perhaps
what Heraclitus, too, wanted to say though it is hard to tell because
he does not express himself well’ (   
, 187a3-4); cf. Eryximachus’
recurrence to the point at a8 (). Either
Heraclitus also had the right idea — in which case it took Eryximachus
to articulate the point effectively — or we must view the philosopher
as endorsing the strikingly absurd position that harmony and discord
may coexist (
, a6-8).
As McPherran maintains, the speech of Eryximachus indeed shows
that the physician is ‘no slave to Presocratic science.’40 This fact is not,
however, as McPherran contends, a point in its favor. Quite the opposite is the case since Eryximachus proceeds to mangle the nuance in
Heraclitus’ position — as expressed by ‘the one ... “being at variance
with itself is in agreement with itself” “like the attunement of a bow or
a lyre” ’ (187a5-6) — via a heavy-handed pronouncement on harmony’s
necessarily arising in a sequential manner (whose formulation features
a sharp disjunction between  and , b1).41 Eryxima-

39

For detailed treatment of Empedocles’ distinctive status qua philosophical influence on Hippocratic medicine in this period, see Longrigg, Rational Medicine,
Chaps. 2-3 and Chap. 4, 91-2. On the formulation of Jouanna, ‘Présence d’Empédocle’, 462, ‘imité ou critiqué, Empédocle reste un grand nom dans la médecine à
la fin du cinquième siècle.’

40

‘Medicine’, 80n27

41

Konstan and Young-Bruehl, ‘Speech’, 41, note, though without exploring its implications for Eryximachus’ standing in Plato’s eyes, that the physician ‘ignores
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chus insists that there can be no harmony as long as high and low are
at odds (
  , b2-4) — promptly repeating the contention so that it
becomes more emphatic still (     

, b5-7). The physician then makes the same point in
the case of rhythm (, b7), again stressing temporal sequence via  and  (c1).
The claim of Dover that Plato’s interpretation of Heraclitus might
not match the latter’s intention, and that the construction attributed
by Plato to Eryximachus might differ from either of these,42 is true in
an abstract exegetical way. At issue here — given that Eryximachus’
logos proffers what he views as an account of reality proper, above all
human flourishing — is the extent to which Eryximachus’ construction
reflects what can be unveiled as Plato’s own. Most specifically, if it can
be shown that the physician’s interpretation of Heraclitus is distinctly
shallower than Plato’s, this would offer support to the view that Eryximachus, qua physician, far from offering his own tenable account of
these pivotal phenomena, cannot even grasp with any subtlety what
pertinent others have said.
Crucially, Plato’s own construction of Heraclitus is more nuanced
than meets the eye based, for instance, on a cursory reading of Cratylus 439b-40d (cf. Tht 181e-2d) that is not placed in the broader context
of his comments involving flux in the dialogues. In his discussion of
the nature of Plato’s Heracliteanism, Irwin — who does not mention
our passage — distinguishes helpfully between ‘self-change’ (‘s-change’)
— which centers on change over time — and ‘aspect-change’ (‘a-change’)
involving the compresence of opposites at a single juncture.43 Irwin
rightly interprets Plato as being aware of both types and as acknowledging an engagement with both on the part of Heraclitus (5, cf. 12).
The aforementioned passages from the Cratylus and Theaetetus leave no

Heraclitus’ concern with the tension in the bow or lyre themselves ... (the bow
seems to be irrelevant to this line of reasoning).’ K. Dorter, ‘The Significance of
the Speeches in Plato’s Symposium’, Philosophy and Rhetoric 2 (1969) 215-34, at 226,
asserts that Eryximachus is ‘almost, but not quite, aware’ of his ‘failure to understand’ Heraclitus — without, however, indicating expressly what grounds this
claim concerning the doctor’s incipient awareness.
42

Symposium, ad loc.

43

T.H. Irwin, ‘Plato’s Heracleiteanism’, Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1977) 1-13, at 4
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doubt that Plato was cognizant of the former and associated Heraclitus
therewith. As Irwin remarks (5), salient evidence of Plato’s awareness
that the Ionian also foregrounded what Irwin dubs ‘a-change’ is found
in the Hippias Major, where Plato cites Heraclitus B82: ‘Don’t you know
that what Heraclitus said holds good — “the finest of monkeys is foul
put together with another class” ’ (289a2-4; cf. 289b3-5 and 293b-c). Regarding this type of flux in Heraclitus, one may also consult B8-9, 13, 37,
51 (on whose content Eryximachus draws), 59-61, 83, and 91 — the last
of these being a place where, as Irwin (4n7) observes, Heraclitus ‘clearly
associates compresence of opposites with flux.’ As commentators have
recognized, the Sophist buttresses the view that Plato was aware of his
predecessor’s construction of opposites as compresent: according to the
‘Ionian muse’, namely, Heraclitus, ‘in being taken apart they’re brought
together’ (242d7-e3); Plato contrasts this stance straightaway with that
of the ‘Sicilian muse’ (i.e., Empedocles) who focuses on alternation
(242e3-3a1).44 Furthermore, as Irwin (5) rightly stresses in this connection, Plato foregrounds compresence as an instance of flux in the Theaetetus: ‘If you call a thing large, it will reveal itself as small, and if you
dub it heavy, it is liable to appear as light, and so on with everything,
because nothing is one or anything or any kind of thing. What is really
true, is this: the things of which we naturally say that they “are”, are in
process of coming to be’ (152d4-e1).
Given that Plato himself (1) is aware of the two types of flux, (2)
knows that Heraclitus had also identified such, and (3) like Heraclitus,
ties compresence to flux, it is significant that he presents Eryximachus
as evincing no element of this understanding — indeed, quite the opposite. Drawing on Irwin’s terminology, one may attribute to Eryximachus
the view that instantiating proper ‘s-change’ eliminates tension — at
least at the juncture in question. Plato foregrounds both the physician’s
ignorance and his presumption by having him contend that Heraclitus
either had the wrong idea or expressed himself poorly by not declaring
plainly that he had temporal sequences in view. Eryximachus — taking himself to provide the lucidity that, regrettably, Heraclitus did not
— states explicitly that it is through temporal shifts that such harmony
as exists is produced. Yet the material cited by Eryximachus, construed
by him as an unmistakable instance of ‘s-change’, is in fact a salient
expression of ‘a-change’. Hence Eryximachus allocates to Heraclitus a

44

On the connection of this passage to Eryximachus’ handling of Heraclitus, see also
Robin, Symposium, livn2; and Rosen, Symposium, 109-10.
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confusion that is in fact his own. Plato attributes this striking muddle to
Eryximachus, I believe, in order to make a point about the physician’s
lack of insight and of a refined capacity for reflection. I cannot agree,
therefore, with the contention of Wardy that ‘Eryximachus’ reading remains an option in the Symposium.’45 In my view, it cannot be an ‘option’ qua interpretation of the Heraclitean material in question here.
The core issue is not that temporal sequences, too, figure in Heraclitus’
thought and that Plato is aware of this: rather, Eryximachus both limits
himself to temporal sequences in his construction of flux and distorts
Heraclitean material that clearly singles out harmony through contemporaneous tension in order to force it into line with the sequential construction that he treats as exclusive.
Notably, in conjunction with this, the dialogue foregrounds, in the
ascent, Plato’s reconstituted notion of ‘a-change’:   , in
contrast to  , is not, for instance, ‘beautiful in relation to one
thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful here but ugly
there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for
others’ (211a3-5, cf. 211d8-e4). The distinction between an existent’s being F without and with qualification, which lies at the core of Plato’s
metaphysics in the middle dialogues, anchors this crucial passage
(210a-12a). In addition, earlier in Socrates’ speech Plato invokes his revised construction of ‘s-change’ in remarks stressing the existence of
incremental shifts within individuals moving through the life cycle
(208a-b).46 Hence, in the very dialogue in which Eryximachus mangles
Heraclitus, Plato incorporates his own constructions of Heraclitus’ twofold distinction — an inclusion that assumes the nuanced awareness of
his predecessor treated above.
Two central procedural parallels come to mind here. First, Eryximachus’ speech illustrates the flaw in craftspeople’s construction of their
own understanding, which, as fathomed by Socrates when striving to
interpret the Oracle at Delphi in the Apology, consists in their wrongly

45

‘Unity’, 7

46

Regarding 208a-b see Irwin, ‘Heracleiteanism’, 6: ‘Diotima shows how someone
remains the same man throughout his lifetime; s-changes are regular and maintain
a close qualitative similarity between the man at one time and at another.’ For an
unqualified reference to ‘the flux doctrine’ as involved at 207e1-8a3, see Wardy,
‘Unity’, 37. He later maintains that Diotima here ‘asserts  ’ — treating
the notion, however, as a Heraclitean idea rather than as reflecting a noteworthy
Platonic reconstitution thereof (59-60).
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assuming that their adeptness in one arena of craft automatically translates into insight regarding far more salient topics (22c9-e1).47 Second,
Eryximachus’ presumption involving Heraclitus ties him to Protagoras’ stance involving the poets, as characterized in the eponymous
dialogue. Konstan and Young-Bruehl, too, note a link to the Protagoras, citing it as a point in Eryximachus’ favor: aside from the logos of
Socrates, Eryximachus’ ‘is the only one which rivals ... Protagoras’ great
speech, in the dialogue named for that sophist, for philosophical signif48
icance and coherence.’ I maintain, in contrast, that a comparison with
the Protagoras illustrates from another setting Plato’s concern to expose
the presumption and danger of unbridled claims to authority that are
lacking in justification.49
At 339a-d, the sophist maintains that Simonides contradicts himself,
stating initially that it is quite difficult to become good but later rejecting Pittacus’ contention that being good is such. The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, which escapes Protagoras’ awareness in
his articulation of Simonides’ confusion, plays a salient role in Socrates’
response to the sophist’s construction. According to Protagoras, others, including Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, had shied away from
dubbing themselves sophists due to their fear of censure (316d-17a);
while the label’s attachment to poets was others’ doing, the fifth-century contemporaries of Socrates pointedly appropriate it for themselves
(on which point see 317b4-5, with Socrates’ later reaction at 348e5-9a4).
In Protagoras’ view, not only were ancient poets the earliest, albeit not
self-identified, sophistai, but crucial to paideia is one’s being ‘in command
of poetry,’ which Protagoras construes as expertise in poetic exegesis
(338e-9a). As one would expect given the competitive spirit of sophistic practice, the ensuing interpretation of Simonides (339a-41e) evinces
Protagoras’ conviction that this activity surpasses the poetic since the
latter requires hermeneutical displays of sophistic virtuosity for the full
attainment of its value to the soul.50 Plato of course does not find such

47

This parallel is also noted by M.P. Nichols, Socrates on Friendship and Community:
Reflections on Plato’s Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis (New York: Cambridge University Press 2009), 30-1.

48

‘Speech’, 44

49

Naturally, parallels are drawn against a backdrop of difference; most salient here
is the fact that, in Plato’s view, sophistry lacks all legitimacy as a practice.

50

In these remarks on the Protagoras, I draw on S.B. Levin, ‘Platonic Metaphysics
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displays to be insightful and rejects the notion that sophists — not, in
his view, in fact practitioners of a technê (and, moreover, directing their
efforts toward poetic praxis, from which Plato also withholds this designation) — could correctly and reliably articulate what was and was
not salutary, above all where the good is concerned, in their own or
others’ formulations. While there are differences between the scenarios
of the Symposium and Protagoras — it suffices for Eryximachus’ point
if Heraclitus turns out to be demonstrably unclear rather than simply
wrong, and if the latter obtains it is not, as with Simonides, because
the philosopher contradicts himself — in both cases Plato targets the
presumed authority of activities whose practitioners, ignorant of reality themselves, challenge the preeminence of those they deem rivals for
supremacy on matters of greatest import.
A further piece of evidence for Eryximachus’ critical engagement
with philosophers on the topic of ultimate principles comes through
what appears to be a correction of Anaximander’s valuation of cyclical
macrocosmic shifts. On the physician’s formulation,
when ... hot and cold, wet and dry, happen to be governed by the proper form of Love toward one another, they exhibit harmony and a temperate mixture (), they come
bearing good harvest and health to human beings, other animals, and
plants, and there is no injustice ( ). But when the Erôs
powered by hubris controls the seasons of the year, destruction and
injustice prevail (    ). He spreads the
plague and many other diseases among plants and animals; he causes
frost and hail and blights. All these are the effects of the immodest and
disordered kind of Love (     
) on the movements of the stars and
the seasons of the year, that is, on the objects studied by the science
called astronomy. (188a2-b6)51

and Semantics: The Cratylus’ Ties to the Sophist and Politicus’, in D. Føllesdal and
J. Woods, eds., Logos and Language: Essays in Honour of Julius Moravcsik (London:
College Publications 2008) 73-98, at 87-8.
51

Interestingly, Prt 315c includes Eryximachus in a group of auditors who were
‘asking Hippias questions on astronomy and physics, and he, from his high seat,
was answering each of their questions point by point’ (cf. 318d-e). The image of
Hippias holding court, patiently taking questions from those wishing to receive
the details of his wisdom, leads one to wonder whether Eryximachus has learned
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On this account, justice prevails — emphatically,  (188a6)
52
— as long as each season is moderate in the way befitting it. This position diverges significantly from the stance of Anaximander, who had
claimed that ordinary seasonal shifts themselves comprise a state of
affairs in which ‘the things that are perish into the things out of which
they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice in accordance with the ordering
of time (
)’ (B1).53 Famously, of course, Anaximander is subsequently corrected by Heraclitus (B80), from whose position Eryximachus also departs insofar as Heraclitus’ construction — according to
which  — includes no proviso marginalizing ‘extreme’, or ‘extraordinary’, occurrences as infelicitous; quite the opposite. That Eryximachus would not
gravitate toward this position is to be expected given his stance toward
Heraclitus in the preceding treatment of mousikê.

some of what he ‘knows’ (and perhaps also how to present ideas involving physis
with maximal rhetorical effectiveness) from the likes of Hippias. Reinforcing this
picture of Hippias as a self-proclaimed authority on such matters is Hp ma 281c-d,
where the sophist maintains that his wisdom surpasses that of all other ‘wise’ individuals, including philosophers from Thales through Anaxagoras; subsequently,
astronomy is described (by Socrates, with irony) as a domain comprising things
that Hippias ‘know[s] most finely’ (285b8-c1). For Hippias as impacting both the
form and the content of Eryximachus’ logos, see Rettig, Symposium, 16-17 and 179.
Given Plato’s vigorous, unrelenting challenge to the technê status of sophistry,
such a link would necessarily reflect quite badly on Eryximachus. For a different
construction see Edelstein, ‘Rôle’, 160, according to whom the doctor’s ‘interest
in questions of natural philosophy and astronomy,’ as evinced at Prt 315c, will, in
Plato’s view, ‘have stood him in good stead.’
52

Cf. Bury, Symposium, ix.
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Tr. R.D. McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary (Indianapolis: Hackett 1994), 43. Konstan and Young-Bruehl, ‘Speech’, 43,
state simply that the term  ‘underscores the anthropomorphic attribution
of good and bad impulses to the cosmos.’ According to C.H. Kahn, Anaximander
and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia University Press 1960),
179, Eryximachus’ concern here is quite different from that of Anaximander, involving as it does the human body exclusively. I maintain, in contrast, that Eryximachus also has a broader, more ambitious aim stemming from his rivalry with
philosophy for governing insight into overarching cosmic principles.
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V

Eryximachus’ Loose Construction of Technê

Eryximachus’ unreflective assumption that mousikê numbers among
technai (see esp. 187b2 and c4-5) typifies his approach throughout with
respect to the praxeis treated: indeed, his methodology rests on the illustration of his general thesis by appeal to a range thereof. This assumption reflects a freewheeling approach to the classification of activities,
given poetic expression in Prometheus Bound (442-506), with which Plato
takes forceful issue in the Gorgias through his systematic account of a
highly normative notion of technê. The key technê criteria articulated in
that dialogue are: (1) peri ti, or ‘aboutness’ (i.e., the practice in question
requires a genuine ‘subject matter’); (2) understanding: those engaged
in the pursuit must operate with epistêmê, not mere belief; and (3) goodness: the activity must be of genuine benefit to its objects.54
Even as Eryximachus elevates his own technê above all others, his
liberal use of the designation grants it to praxeis whose status as such is
rejected by Plato. The physician is remarkably more generous than Plato, considering that, of those activities discussed — medicine, mousikê,
cookery, astronomy, and mantikê — only one, namely, astronomy, will
still make the cut by the time of the Republic.55 Most of Eryximachus’
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For further discussion see Levin, Ancient Quarrel, 82-4.

55

Astronomy figures in the advanced curriculum of Republic VII and belongs in the
group of technai below that of philosophy in the hierarchy articulated at 533a-d.
Gymnastics and farming are mentioned only in passing (Smp 187a1). There is no
reason to think that the latter is a technê on Plato’s highly normative conception
according to which certain types of artifact production make the grade — though
their standing is lower given the ontological status of the pertinent Forms, construed as ‘functional specifications’ (see J.M.E. Moravcsik, Plato and Platonism:
Plato’s Conception of Appearance and Reality in Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics, and
Its Modern Echoes [Oxford: Blackwell 1992], 66-8), and the fact that orthê doxa is
sufficient to apprehend them (see Levin, ‘Technê’, 135-6). Cookery’s deriding as an
empeiria was discussed in Section III above. Concerning medicine (and gymnastics) in the Republic, see Levin, ‘Technê’; for more on poetry, the focus of Section V,
one may consult Levin, Ancient Quarrel. Features prized most highly by Plato (e.g.,
being eternal and unaltered) are ascribed to Forms (as, e.g., at Phd 80b and Smp
211a-b); notably, his description of eidê in the former passage includes the term
  (b1). Viewed through the lens of the Gorgias — whose subject-matter
criterion comes to be met by Forms, true exemplars of order, upon their subsequent introduction — mantikê as treated by Eryximachus cannot make the grade;
for instance, its subject matter does not exhibit the requisite orderly constitution,
and its practitioners do not operate with genuine insight and hence cannot offer
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logos focuses on technai other than medicine; this, I submit, supports the
view that it is qua medical practitioner that he reaches his overarching
insight. Eryximachus assumes that his competency in the domain of
medicine is not in question; hence, he does not devote his logos to its defense. What requires support, however, is his broader claim about the
cognitive authority of iatrikê, and Eryximachus would not concentrate
so extensively on other technai in his own valorization of medicine if he
lacked confidence that, qua doctor, he was qualified to properly grasp
their dunameis. I thus diverge from the stance of McPherran, according
to which ‘we are no doubt supposed to read all this as a parodic example of high-flying medical rhetoric, but at the same time we should
appreciate the extent to which Eryximachus is himself merely entering into the general light-hearted sympotic spirit of things by speaking
as bombastically as he does.’56 Interestingly, McPherran’s comments
on Eryximachus’ ‘good familiarity’ (76) with the Hippocratic corpus
do not include mention of the striking parallel involving the wealth of
technai drawn on in full seriousness to support the author’s claim in De
victu about overarching cosmic principles — a less protracted version
of which methodology Eryximachus deploys here, omitting discussion,
unlike the Hippocratic author, of forms of artifact-production such as
cobblery (Chap. 15) and basket-making (Chap. 19).57

the necessary rational account (logon didonai) of the core features of their pursuit.
Though Plato sometimes appropriates religious language and imagery to convey
ideas that have been fundamentally reconstituted, Diotima’s role as a functioning
Platonist is evident already prior to the ascent through, e.g., her definition of what
lies between () wisdom and ignorance as      
 (202a2-5); cf. Meno 98a3-4 and R 476e-8e. And the final ‘mysteries’ into which she ‘initiates’ (210a1) Socrates in 210a-12a are none other than the
details of how recollection transpires in the case of Beauty — whose articulation,
as Rowe, Symposium, ad loc., observes, also introduces participation (,
211b2). For a different view of mantikê in the Symposium, one assigning it a prominent role, see McPherran, ‘Medicine’.
56

‘Medicine’, 76-7

57

Like the speech of Eryximachus, De victu construes technê in the loose sense
challenged by Plato in the Gorgias. In Chaps. 12-24 the Hippocratic author underscores what he views as fundamental common ground between the nature of
man, grasped by medicine, and a wide range of other technai: since only the physician apprehends human , ‘both visible and invisible’ ( 
 , 12.2-3), he alone is in a position to adduce this broad spectrum of
illustrations. Therefore, though De victu does not frame the point expressly in this
manner, its working assumption is that medicine is preeminent in relation to this
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For the purposes of illustration I concentrate here on mousikê since
(1) Eryximachus’ treatment of it is the longest in his speech and (2) the
discussion is particularly significant, as we saw, for its inclusion of the
physician’s most pointed challenge to the preeminence of philosophy.
Eryximachus’ improperly generous deployment of the technê designation shows him to lack that understanding of reality in light of which
one could ascertain what praxeis did and did not engage with elements
thereof. The fact that Eryximachus speaks so confidently, yet ignorantly, on what is for Plato a crucial question — namely, what does and does
not qualify as a technê? — helps to undermine his alleged insight and
authority, serving thereby once again to cast the physician in a negative
light.
Plato’s critique of poetry’s technê status unfolds in the Ion, Gorgias,
and Cratylus, and culminates in the Republic. As Republic III makes clear,
the target of his challenge is mousikê in its entirety, that is to say, the language of poetry, along with rhythm and modes.58 I argue elsewhere that
the Republic’s critique of poetic content revolves around the goodness,
understanding, and subject-matter (peri ti) conditions on technai enunciated in the Gorgias.59 The goodness criterion is salient already in Book
I, where Plato stresses that the exclusive aim of each technê is to do what
is best () for its objects (347a1-3). Turning subsequently to
poetry, Plato underscores repeatedly that its creators seek to please the
audience without a concern for its well-being (see, e.g., 387b, 389e-90a,
398a-b, 493c-d, 607a, and 607d-e). In Republic II-III, Plato takes poets to
task for treating as salutary that damaging state of affairs in which one
has a reputation for morality but is actually immoral. He bases poetry’s
failure to meet the goodness condition on its shortcomings with respect

comparison group, practitioners of whose member activities are not in a position to achieve the overarching insight in question. While the author foregrounds
analogy elsewhere in the book (see that between the human body and the ruler
[] in Chap. 25), the illustrations involving technai in Chaps. 12-24 stress
that all, operating with uniform materials governed by identical principles, share
something truly basic with human nature (24.19-21) in a manner that transcends a
merely analogical tie.
58

For Eryximachus’ treatment of mousikê as encompassing poetry, with supporting
reference to Republic II-III, see also Rowe, Symposium, on 187d2.

59

See Levin, Ancient Quarrel, Chap. 5; in the remainder of this paragraph I draw on
that discussion (132-5). On the Cratylus’ investigation, see Ancient Quarrel, Chaps.
1-3.
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to understanding and subject matter (see, e.g., 363e-4c, 365b-c, 493a4a, 597e, and 598d-602b). The conclusion to draw from the Republic’s
extensive critique of poetry is not that virtue fails to be the province of
a genuine technê. It is, indeed, such; that technê, however, is philosophy,
not poetry.
Eryximachus’ focus is on rhythm and harmony as traditionally
construed60 — the dimension of mousikê that Plato takes up in Republic 398d-403c, where he articulates precisely the worries about a pernicious impact on character that he had stressed earlier in Books II-III
concerning poetic language. The key, Plato tells us, is to ensure that
these dimensions of mousikê properly serve the words of poetic compositions: ‘If ... rhythm and mode must conform to the words and not
vice versa, then good rhythm follows fine words and is similar to them,
while bad rhythm follows the opposite kind of words, and the same
for harmony and disharmony’ (400c12-d3, cf. 399e-400a). Proper paideia
involving mousikê is crucial to one’s cultivation and grasp of virtue, and
one’s prospects for achieving sôphrosunê and the rest hinge on the right
exposure thereto (402b-c). Notably, Plato underscores here that ‘excessive pleasure’ () is incompatible with this aretê or
any other (402e), proceeding to single out sexual pleasure as the worst
culprit in this regard (403a-b). Such remarks make clear that all of mousikê as practiced to date is Plato’s critical target; hence, it is mousikê in its
entirety that, in his view, does not — and, moreover, cannot — qualify
as a technê.
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According to Konstan and Young-Bruehl, ‘Speech’, 42, the medical foundation for
Eryximachus’ doctrine of harmony is De victu, which ‘exhibits the closest agreement in both theory and association of topics.’ Yet on their interpretation of mousikê
in Eryximachus’ speech, erôs qua philia — versus erôs qua epithumia as in medicine
— governs there, such that the musician ‘is doing what the doctor does when he
rearranges the elements in the body. But there is nothing in a musical harmony or
discord that corresponds to the various desires of bodies healthy or ill’ (41-2). This
construction undermines the tenability of their stress on De victu’s foundational
role insofar as, on their account, in contrast to that involving mousikê in De victu
18, the relationship between medicine and music — so crucial to Eryximachus’
discussion — becomes in effect one of analogy.
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VI

The Physician’s Wrap-up

Mousikê, treated at length by Eryximachus, is a domain in which the
topic of aretê figures prominently. Prior to his closing remarks, the physician himself has not spoken of virtue though he gestures toward it
— albeit, as we saw, in a highly problematic manner from Plato’s standpoint — through comments involving the vice, akolasia, corresponding to self-control.61 It is only in his wrap-up that Eryximachus turns,
briefly, to aretê — in a passage, previously discussed in Section III,
whose juxtaposition against Gorgias 507e-8a and what transpires earlier
in the physician’s logos was shown to reflect quite poorly on his construction of human flourishing: ‘Such is the power () of Love
— so varied and great that in all cases it might be called absolute. Yet
its power () is greatest when Love is directed, in self-control
and justice, toward good things (     
), whether in heaven or on earth: happiness, the bonds of human society, concord with the gods above — all
these are among his gifts (    
        
)’ (188d4-9).
As Dorter observes, erôs and the good are the dialogue’s two overarching themes.62 For each speaker prior to Socrates, ‘love acquires the
status of a telos, an end pursued or the terminus of an appetite, and for
that reason stands as a final state of perfection, i.e., a god.’63 From Plato’s standpoint, in contrast, as stressed in Section III, grasping the good
is the point of departure for everything else, including one’s arrival at
the true nature and capacity of erôs pertaining thereto. His pointed and
vigorous subjection of erôs to the good begins with Diotima’s comment,
well prior to the ascent, that ‘on my account, a lover does not seek
the half or the whole, unless ... it turns out to be good as well’ (205e13). The ascent, which, from Plato’s standpoint, renders erôs properly
subordinate to virtue and the good,64 systematizes his reversal of the
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Thus far the sole use of pertinent terminology has come in 188a5, where 
is employed regarding the seasons.
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‘Speeches’, 234n10
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D.C. Schindler, ‘Plato and the Problem of Love: On the Nature of Eros in the Symposium’, Apeiron 40 (2007) 199-220, at 207

64

On the limited role of erôs there, see J.M.E. Moravcsik, ‘Reason and Eros in the
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physician’s ordering with regard to fundamental principles and pointedly excludes (207d with 210a6, 211b5, and 211d-12a) all indulgence of
sexual desire — which Eryximachus pointedly wished to encompass
— as a manifestation of erôs that is wholly antithetical to one’s prospects for eudaimonia.
Far from being tied organically to what precedes, let alone providing the foundation for an account that authoritatively addresses human
flourishing, Eryximachus’ brief comments are merely tacked on at the
end as obligatory for one who wishes to encompass human erôs in an
all-embracing account of ‘what is’ that privileges balance and what is
sound as involving the absence of tension and extremes. Though Eryximachus mentions sôphrosunê (with dikaiosunê), his logos makes clear that
he has no idea what such is or how it is produced. In fact, as we have
seen, his own pertinent remarks reflect a flawed construction that, if
followed, would be decidedly hostile to individuals’ cultivation of it
and eudaimonia more generally.
In closing, Eryximachus states that ‘if I omitted anything from my
encomium, it wasn’t intentional ()’ (188d9-e2).65 Given Eryximachus’ pointed concern that his account be all-encompassing,
the comment of Dover — ’we can well believe that’ — is apposite.66
Aristophanes’ logos inaugurates a focus on the nature of erôs as conceptually and existentially prior to its effects.67 This puts the proceedings
on a more direct course toward Plato’s articulation of his own stance
concerning the nature and role of erôs in the ascent (210a-12a).

“Ascent”-Passage of the Symposium’, in J.P. Anton and G.L. Kustas, eds., Essays in
Ancient Greek Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press 1971) 285302.
65

Bury, Symposium, construes  in 188e1 to mean ‘I as well as Pausanias’.

66

Symposium, ad loc. Cf. Robin, Symposium, lvi: ‘Il ne doute pas du succès de son
enterprise.’

67

See Nehamas and Woodruff, Symposium, xvii. As they observe (xv), Eryximachus’
encomium, along with those of Phaedrus and Pausanias, concentrates on the effects of erôs rather than on its nature, which — as we know, e.g., from the Meno’s
handling of aretê and its teachability — is precisely the reverse of how one ought
to proceed. In this respect it may be grouped with the dialogue’s less perspicacious
offerings.
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VII Conclusion
According to McPherran, at 194a ‘Plato has Socrates praise the beauty
— hence, the correctness, it seems — of Eryximachus’ speech.’68 The
argument of this paper supports the view that such ‘praise’ is ironically
69
meant. And in fact Socrates’ remark here is accompanied by laudatory
words regarding Agathon’s logos-to-be, which — given what is to follow involving the poet — should render one suspicious of his sincerity
in either case. The physician, Socrates tells us, fears (193e) lest there
remain nothing to say at this point ‘because you did beautifully in the
contest, Eryximachus. But if you ever get in my position, or rather the
position I’ll be in after Agathon’s spoken so well, then you’ll really be
afraid’ (194a1-4). Subsequently, Eryximachus believes that Agathon has
excelled (198a), and Socrates states that the poet’s remarks were delivered ‘with ... beauty’ (198b2-3, cf. b7). Yet Socrates proceeds to challenge the veracity of Agathon’s logos on salient fronts, which fact both
indicates that the earlier observation was made ironically and reflects
poorly once again on Eryximachus’ judgment — this time for having
lavished praise on Agathon’s contribution, which, like his own, displays faulty constructions of aretai (196b-7b).
Any technê whose cognitive authority is overarching, and whose
comprehensive grasp of principles warrants its serving as monitor of
whether good outcomes in all specific arenas have been attained, is virtually certain not also to involve the practical facility needed to produce
those same results in each and every human activity. Notably, despite
his almost boundless inclination to self-aggrandizement where his profession is concerned, Eryximachus’ awareness of this difference in scope
between cognitive and practical competence is indicated by his pointed
distinction, in the case of mousikê (187c-d), between a theoretical grasp
of rhythm and harmony as such —       
 (c57) — and their application to people (introduced by  , c8)
in order to produce the proper effect: the latter, but not the former, requires a skilled practitioner (, d3-4) of the technê
in question.70
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‘Medicine’, 77n17
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Cf. Rettig, Symposium, ad loc.

70

Eryximachus had previously gestured toward a distinction between theory and
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As the technê par excellence in the Republic, philosophy is the overseer both of other technai and of pertinent non-technai due to the superlative and unique insight of its practitioners. As Plato makes clear via
the Principle of Specialization71 (370a-c, 374b-c) and subsequent discussion of individual praxeis and their interrelations, this understanding
does not equip philosophers to undertake all activities that benefit the
polis but rather only those bearing directly on rule. Thus, for instance,
Plato remarks that the state’s founders, already possessing distinct
responsibilities of their own, are not also to assume the task of composing stories: ‘Their job is to know the patterns according to which
poets must construct their tales and from which they mustn’t deviate’
(379a1-3). Their insight does, however, permit philosophers to ensure
that other activities bearing on individual and communal flourishing,
both technai and non-, promote this goal reliably. In the Symposium the
rivalry between medicine and philosophy for primacy in determina72
tions involving nature and flourishing is clearly in evidence. Through
the character of Eryximachus — who embraces the subordination of
philosophy to his own profession in De vetere medicina and whose methodology crucially parallels that of De victu — medicine goes head-tohead with philosophy for the title of preeminent technê. In Plato’s eyes,
medicine, as I have argued, loses this battle decisively.
McPherran aims to reconcile or effect a ‘combination’ of (86) the two
depictions — those of physician and philosopher — through invocation
of a notion of the physician-philosopher (e.g., ‘true physicians must be
philosophers,’ 93). What McPherran has in view here is not wholly evi-

practice in his remarks concerning medicine at 186c5-d5; on the distinction there
see Bury, Symposium, ad loc. When the doctor serves as theoretician, and medicine
rather than mousikê is involved, a single person can adopt both vantage points.
71

So dubbed by J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1981), 73.
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S.A. Brill, ‘Medical Moderation in Plato’s Symposium’, Studies in the History of Ethics
11 (2006) 1-28, at 12, notes a clash, albeit limited, between the two practices, but
grounds it in medicine’s exploitation of human fears of death, not fundamentally
different approaches to nature and thriving more generally. Though G.A. Scott
and W.A. Welton, Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato’s Symposium
(Albany: State University of New York Press 2008), stress Plato’s rivaling of alternative praxeis in the Symposium, they focus on poetry, specifically. Medicine’s
shortcoming is its ‘incomplete[ness]’ (199), not fundamentally flawed constructions of physis and eudaimonia; on their interpretation, Socrates’ logos ‘synthesize[s]
the rationalism of Eryximachus and the piety of Aristophanes’ (152, cf. 192).
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dent, as he does not elaborate the concept or clearly distinguish it from
that of the ‘properly philosophically-oriented physician’ (94n52) — of
whom Eryximachus is said to be the model though, due to the doctor’s
‘physicalistic’ approach, which is wholly rejected by Diotima (87), ‘the
complete physician who would bring us a return to our original wholeness ... is no Eryximachus’ (95). This lack of transparency stems in part
from the fact that McPherran assumes an essential uniformity in Plato’s
stance involving medicine across the corpus (e.g., 77, 79). In any case, as
a notion attributed to Plato, the physician-philosopher is untenable for
the same reason that Tate’s construction of the poet-philosopher fails,73
namely, due to the Principle of Specialization, which precludes one and
the same individual’s being naturally suited to two distinct tasks.
Alternatively, if by this rubric McPherran simply wishes to single
out the philosopher as a kind of ‘soul-doctor’, this function is already
encompassed by what Plato places in his purview. Though analogized
or otherwise related at times to bodily care and condition, the philosopher’s actual task centers on tending the soul; how medical practice
itself, even a revamped version thereof, would be accommodated on
McPherran’s picture is not addressed. At this juncture, contra McPherran, it would seem that Plato agrees with the author of De vetere medicina
that medicine and philosophy must go their separate ways. However,
medicine’s special status vis-à-vis the good — according to which its
promotion may necessitate the doctor’s not deploying his skill though a
condition of manifest illness may be ameliorated thereby — will be crucial to its subsequent removal from the ranks of technai and the reconstitution of its dependency, contra Hippocratic medicine’s grounding
in Presocratic thought, on philosophy à la Plato in the Republic. Thus,
rather than consolidating the two forms of expertise, Plato argues there
that the physician’s properly executing his societal task will necessitate,
where appropriate, collaboration with the philosopher and subordination to his vision of the Good.74 This further step in Plato’s critique of
medicine — a key opponent as he seeks to bolster philosophy’s role as

73

See J. Tate, ‘Plato, Art and Mr. Maritain’, New Scholasticism 12 (1938) 107-42; ‘Plato
and “Imitation” ’, Classical Quarterly 26 (1932) 161-9; and ‘ “Imitation” in Plato’s
Republic’, Classical Quarterly 22 (1928) 16-23.
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In the Republic, Plato does not relinquish the notion that medicine holds up well by
comparison with certain other activities (e.g., sophistry/rhetoric). As with poetry
and the work of auxiliaries, while not a technê in the Gorgias’ sense, it may contribute, nonetheless, to communal welfare.
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arbiter on the all-important topics of physis and eudaimonia — is made
possible by the Symposium, whose central role in the agôn between philosophy and medicine I have sought to illuminate here.75
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